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Beyond the Scope of Managerialism: Explaining the Organisational Invisibility of Police 
Work 
Abstract 
This chapter examines the limited scope of managerialism on police practice, based on an 
ethnographic study of operational, street-level officers in a metropolitan police force in 
England and Wales. Using interactions between officers and people with mental health 
issues as a case study, it focuses on the significance that environmental and task boundaries 
place on organisational control of practice. 
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Introduction 
Organisational control mechanisms focusing on performance and outputs are often 
essential factors in determining the scope and direction of working practice. A significant 
literature on professional work focuses on the limitations and boundaries of control, from 
both a conceptual and structural perspective (Bannick et al., 2016; Evetts, 2003; Frey et al., 
2013; Gundhus, 2012; Power, 2007), and the practical realities of how street-level workers 
adapt to the various iterations of instruments of control (Lipsky, 2010; McCann et al., 2013; 
Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2003). While much of the historical roots of organisational 
control mechanisms lie in the private sector (Power, 2007), the integration of New Public 
Management (NPM) metrics and control systems into the public sector (from the 1980s) has 
spawned discussion on the extent to which public sector professional interests and 
expertise have been co-opted, curtailed or have resisted integration into a managerialist 
framework (O’Reilly and Reed, 2011). In particular, the control of professional autonomy 
and discretion in everyday working practice is seen as a crucial factor in attempts to change 
occupational cultures linked to historical failure and outdated modes of work (Charman, 
2017; Holdaway, 2017; Fournier, 1999). The ways in which these new mechanisms are 
operationalised and how employees adapt to its requirements will have significant impacts 
on the nature and quality of service delivery (Power, 2007). 
This chapter examines the factors that impact on an organisation’s ability to successfully 
operationalise control measures to standardise working practice to a level that allows task 
regulation, audit and scrutiny—the ability of management and regulators to monitor 
employee compliance and to view change in action, from a distance. The empirical data 
used are derived from an ethnographic study of a police force in England and Wales. 
Policing in England and Wales is currently in the midst of adapting to significant, austerity-
driven structural change. Its operational challenge is the prioritisation and distribution of 
work, in an era of increased demand, changing demand and reduced staffing levels (Boulton 
et al., 2017). Parallel to this challenge is a politically driven agenda to ‘re-professionalise’ 
policing, to unravel the old ‘occupational closure’ model of policing and to replace it with a 
managerialised, harm reduction, vulnerability reduction model required to adapt to current 
requirements and to rectify service delivery mistakes of the past (Holdaway, 2017). Both a 
pragmatic approach to austerity cuts and the skillset adjustment to professional status 
require tight institutional control of finances, resources and the transfer of new knowledge 
into practice. This chapter’s focus on control of policing practice explores the extent to 
which the physical working environment and the task characteristics of police work place 
restrictions on the extent and type of managerial control that the organisation will attempt 
to exercise over officers. The invisibility (to the organisation) of the policing environment 
(Rowe, 2007) and the ambiguity and complexity of tasks (Bannick et al., 2016 ) place 
boundaries on the visibility of outcomes and the degree of prescriptive regulation 
applicable. This, in turn, raises the thorny question of the extent to which experiential 
knowledge and discretion are effectively ineradicable (Evans, 2016; Lipsky, 2010), suggesting 
that managerial attempts to control every aspect of policing cannot work as intended. Many 
aspects of police work cannot be rendered visible, standardised and controllable. 
Drawing on empirical evidence relating to interactions between operational police officers 
and individuals with mental health issues, the chapter will highlight the complexity of 
practice issues in two distinct operational settings—in the community and in police 
custody—and the variable consequences for all of those involved: police officers, support 
staff and the wider public. The chapter continues in four further sections. The first section 
focuses on the concept of managerialism as a means of organisational control and a way to 
restrict and shape the practice environment and task characteristics. In the second section, 
the research design is outlined. The findings are presented in the third section, analysing 
policing practice in the community and in police custody, highlighting the unintended and 
undisclosed consequences of policing complex issues. Finally, the conclusion discusses the 
flaws in a managerialist approach to practice change and argues that to maintain public 
safety and minimise injustice, application of professional attributes of autonomy, discretion 
and experiential knowledge will always be required in the complex practice environment of 
street-level, public sector work. 
 
Managerialism as a Control Mechanism in the Public Sector 
A key element of this chapter is the ways in which, since the 1980s, the public sector in 
general and policing in particular has been controlled by the discourses, systems and logics 
of managerialism (Gilling, 2014). Evolving in its current iteration, through NPM reforms, 
conflicting logics of enterprise and auditability are realised through demands for 
accountability and transparency, demanding, as Power (2007, p. 197) states, “cultural ideals 
of precision, proof and calculability”. Applying principles widely used in the private sector, 
NPM strategies have determined and controlled public sector resource provision, 
incorporating measurement and scrutiny largely via metrics-driven audit and risk 
management systems (O’Reilly and Reed, 2011; Power, 2007). Emphasis is placed on the use 
of standards and performance measures with the requirement for managers and employees 
to work on quantifiable and measurable tasks (Hood, 1991). The potentially negative 
consequences of focusing on quantifiable output controls based on efficiency, rather than 
the social and equitable value of operational practice, is particularly significant in the public 
sector given the importance of public legitimacy (Skinns, 2009; Power, 2007) and the ‘policy 
alienation’ experienced by employees who fail to comprehend the relationship between 
newly imposed NPM practices and the greater public good (Tummers et al., 2009, p. 690). 
Managerial control, in its public sector guise, provides mechanisms of authority that go 
alongside (and in the policing case form a central part of) professionalisation programmes, 
in particular where tight control is required to impose new employee standards, behaviours 
and practice and to remove variation and discretion. Principles of accountability via external 
regulation, legal legitimacy, standardised practice and performance-related measures are 
trademark traits of the kinds of control mechanisms used to influence and regulate 
professions and occupations (Evans, 2016; Gundhus, 2012; Power, 2007). Control ‘from 
above’ is often a means of enforcing change, a disciplinary logic to transform and reformat 
practice and expertise (Fournier, 1999). Policing is currently undergoing a ‘top-down’ 
transition from occupational to organisational professionalism, enforced, in part, by historic 
institutional failures (e.g. systemic national occurrences of child sexual exploitation, the 
Saville enquiry, the Stephen Lawrence case, Hillsborough; see Holdaway, this volume). Since 
2013, a politically driven transformation programme has changed the institutional landscape 
of policing in England and Wales with the reconfiguration of regulatory bodies and their 
senior management. Independent oversight has replaced police control of managerial posts 
regulating training, standards, scrutiny and discipline, creating a network of institutional 
control (Holdaway, 2017). A discourse of cultural change through the prioritisation of a 
vulnerability agenda (focusing on those most vulnerable in society as opposed to dealing 
with universal crime and disorder) has required a move from the historical concept of police 
professionalism as a craft-based occupation, requiring autonomous and discretional practice 
(Bartkowiak-Theron and Asquith, 2014; Reiner, 2000; Rowe, 2016), to a more scientific and 
evidence-based version of practice (Gundhus, 2012; Myhill and Johnson, 2015; Willis and 
Mastrofski, 2014). In this iteration of professionalism, the fear of ‘loose cannon’ street-level 
workers controlling, evolving and ultimately changing practice is replaced by managerial 
control of what needs to be done, how it should be done and how it is inspected, measured 
and enforced. 
In the context of new control measures, managers are potentially more able to restrict the 
freedom of workers, including expert professionals (Evans, 2016; Evetts, 2011). Sociology of 
work literatures contain numerous examples of implicit and explicit worker resistance to 
managerial control in an effort to sustain professional autonomy (McCann et al., 2013; 
Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2003; Moskos, 2008). The literature implies a manager-
worker power struggle with, at its core, a breakdown in principles, communication and 
general resistance to change for economic, social, professional and political reasons. Yet, in 
many working environments, the ability of managers to control working practice and the 
extent to which it can be controlled is equally as reliant on environment and task 
characteristics as it is on the will and desires of workers (Lipsky, 2010). Control, audit and 
scrutiny of practice are only possible as far as the tasks and associated actions and results 
are visible to the organisation (Bannick et al., 2016). Yet much of the working environment 
of public sector workers (paramedics, social workers, police officers, firefighters) takes place 
outside the organisation, on the streets, in neighbourhoods, where staff are scattered and 
dispersed, with little supervision and where external accountability is difficult. This 
environment gives street-level workers, whether subversive or not, scope to make their 
account of the reality of their actions the authoritative one, with very little corroboration 
possible (Reiner, 2000; Lipsky, 2010). 
Within this environment, control metrics to increase practice visibility and to reveal, 
uncover and standardise actions and results rely, primarily, on the type and nature of the 
practice task. Literature focuses on the complexity and ambiguity level of tasks as a 
precursor to the implementation of organisational control mechanisms (Bannick et al., 2016; 
Frey et al., 2013). High levels of complexity (e.g. where there are multiple options and actors 
or uncertainty of factual estimations of social problems), combined with high levels of 
ambiguity (uncertainty, for example, around legal or social problems and solutions) are 
often deemed unsuitable for managerialist or process-based control metrics. In this 
schematic, output control is only feasible where knowledge relating to the task is clear, 
stable, not subject to change and is, ideally, observable. Different combinations of ambiguity 
and complexity are seen to require different control solutions. 
In reality, practice tasks carried out daily by street-level workers in the public sector are 
usually dynamic and multi-layered and cannot always be compartmentalised and 
categorised (Lipsky, 2010; Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2003; Bannick et al., 2016). 
Questions such as ‘what happened’ and ‘who did what’ and ‘why’ are complex enough when 
there is only one agency involved and become yet more problematic with inter-agency 
working. Management control theory on the organisational response to changing 
environments (such as bureaucratic, professional, managerialist, with corresponding metrics 
of process, output and input control (Bannick et al., 2016; Frey et al., 2013)) suggests the 
ability for organisational flexibility and adaptation. Yet, in practice, this is often not the case. 
In UK policing, the professionalisation programme appears fixed on a process-controlled, 
standardised, managerialist approach to ensure professional requirements around the 
practice of priority issues (e.g. vulnerability) are adhered to. If anything, the solution to non-
compliance is a stricter dose of process metrics, rather than a change in approach. 
The focus of this chapter, on policing practice around mental health-related incidents, 
highlights the depth of the problems involved in trying to control and manage such complex, 
indeterminate, discretionary activity. Mental health is a clear policing priority in England and 
Wales within the broader vulnerability agenda (Cummins and Edmonson, 2015). Police 
contact with individuals deemed to have mental health issues has risen significantly during 
the last five years, partly due to increased police awareness and prioritisation and partly 
because of the impact of austerity on community services (Cummins, 2012; Leese and 
Russell, 2017; McLean and Marshall, 2010; Senior et al., 2014). Complexity and ambiguity in 
dealing with mental health calls is multi-layered. The nature of the conditions and their 
severity may not be apparent to officers or initially disclosed until, for example, a detainee is 
in custody. Legalities are often described as vague by practitioners, and there is often 
confusion/elision with symptoms of other health problems, notably drug and alcohol abuse 
(McLean and Marshall, 2010). Importantly, outcomes can be processed by officers through 
either a health or a crime pathway (or a combination of both). The transfer from 
behavioural action to criminal action, therefore, depends on complex decisions and 
perceptions by street-level workers, often unsupervised and working in both the invisible 
environment (on the street) and the highly visible environment of the custody suite (with 
extensive CCTV coverage and accountability through prescriptive electronic systems). 
Focusing on one prioritised clientele group (individuals suffering from poor mental health), 
managed within one control mechanism (managerialism), should, in theory, produce 
standardised outcomes, whether intended or unintended. The potential for outcomes to be 
based only around auditable process, making auditability of practice the focus of 
organisational scrutiny and good practice, is well documented (Power, 2007; Hood, 1991). In 
this scenario, non-auditable tasks are often disregarded, with organisational performance 
and operational practice siloed. The creation of two strata of practice—one visible (risk 
averse, process driven) and the other invisible (left to the discretion of practitioners) allows 
the possibility of inequality of service. 
 
Research Methods 
Data were collected from an ethnographic study of policing in a metropolitan police force in 
England and Wales (renamed ‘Eastside’, for anonymity), between 2015 and 2017. The 
author, a retired police inspector with 30 years policing experience, interviewed 35 
operational officers and spent 100 hours observing a team of 34 response officers on mobile 
patrol. Interviews were conducted in two Eastside divisions (one inner city, one on the 
outskirts) with observations and ad hoc interviews in the same inner city division. Analysis of 
detailed interviews directed the scope of the observations which were documented, 
transcribed and written in a series of vignettes to portray the full context of incidents and 
outcomes as well as officers’ (and the researchers’) comments and opinions on these 
incidents. 
The study portrays a wide range of policing practice and roles, from serious, potentially life-
threatening scenarios to routine administrative tasks. This particular chapter discusses these 
activities in two different policing environments, the community and police station custody 
and back office. It focuses exclusively on data relating to policing mental health incidents 
(where the condition is either known or discovered at a later point). The specific task 
characteristics of these incidents highlight the problems and indeterminacies of managerial 
control mechanisms and metrics. Firstly, I discuss data from the invisible (community) 
policing environment and secondly from the visible (custody) environment, describing the 
unintended and undisclosed consequences of managerialist control. 
 
Controlling the Invisible Policing Environment 
The invisible policing environment commences when officers leave the relative visibility of a 
police station on foot or vehicle and choose their direction and purpose of travel. The extent 
of organisational control of patrol (assignment and task requirements) can be total or 
minimal. They can include, for example, assignment to an incident or task by a control room 
operative or supervisor, a self-generated requirement to complete a task as part of an 
ongoing enquiry (such as collecting a statement), or self-directed patrol of a high crime area 
as a preventative measure. Officers, working away from the station, are only visible to the 
small section of the public they have contact with (and who have little say on what they are 
doing and why). Incident allocation at Eastside was prioritised on a graded matrix, based on 
the potential vulnerability of people involved, e.g. victims and witnesses. Officers were 
directed to either specific, definable incidents (a closed task with prescribed procedural 
requirements), e.g. domestic violence, juveniles missing from care homes, or non-specific 
incidents (open, dynamic, ambiguous tasks, with limited procedural guidance), e.g. suicidal 
person, street disturbance. Incidents involving contact with people with mental health 
issues generally fell into the latter category and took up a significant proportion of officers’ 
shift time. Calls ranged from violent disturbances in the street, to suicidal individuals 
carrying knives, to the daily occurrence of multiple police officers guarding individuals 
awaiting mental health assessment at hospital. On one evening shift, nine officers (two 
thirds of the available officers on duty) were at a hospital for four to five hours each. 
Practice control was often initiated by other agencies, such as ambulance, mental health 
and social services, indirectly taking resource control from the policing domain, to the 
consternation of officers who often questioned the validity of non-police directives. One 
officer noted the following: 
We are seeing more mental health incidents. The mental health team know that if they ring 
us we will deal with it. The ambulance service asks for assistance with, say, a suicidal male, 
but it’s only assistance because they can’t allocate the job. So we are blue lighting to assist 
the ambulance service for a job they are not even at because our criteria is that someone is 
in immediate risk, as we have a different grading policy to them and they know we will do 
that. 
In Eastside, supervisory oversight (a potential means of increasing organisational visibility), 
of operational practice on the streets, was minimal. On average, two shift sergeants, 
responsible for the immediate supervision of the patrol officers, remained in the station 
back office, checking the computerised incident log and the allocation of resources and 
completing myriad bureaucratic tasks, such as reviewing crime reports. There were only 
three occasions (out of hundreds of allocated incidents) during the observation period when 
a sergeant left the station to attend an incident (a suspicious death, a gas leak in a town 
centre premises, and to speak to officers guarding a detainee at hospital). Sergeants 
universally viewed their role (with some resentment) as desk-based; part command and 
control, part administrative. Senior management were blamed by many for over-burdening 
the role with paperwork. In essence, the intense scrutiny requirements of patrol control 
metrics (processes, reports, incident logs) left sergeants unavailable to supervise their 
officers on the streets. This left a vacuum where officers (many with less than two years’ 
service) were left to fend for themselves at daily incidents where there was serious risk of 
harm to the public (and officers). These incidents were often complex, ambiguous and 
dynamic, with changing scenarios and multiple task options and outcomes. Information 
passed back to the control room and documented on official reports and databases was 
often minimal. Officers updated the results and simply moved to the next job. There were 
no debriefs at the station or scrutiny of actions. As such, serious incidents were routinised 
and virtually invisible to the organisation. Yet many of these incidents involved people 
displaying mental health symptoms, a categorisation of police contact deemed a local and 
national priority within the vulnerability agenda. 
The consequences of actions in an invisible environment, beyond prescriptive control, 
without scrutiny and oversight and with multiple outcomes, were undisclosed to the 
organisation. In Eastside, those most vulnerable were the most likely to get poor outcomes. 
Officers, left to make autonomous, discretional decisions under pressure, often displayed 
attributes of poor leadership, questionable decision-making and limited knowledge. One 
incident (of many) involving a call to a male brandishing a knife illustrates the problem. The 
male, suffering from severe mental health issues, had called at his ex-partner’s house 
waving a knife, believing he was being ‘ambushed’. Eight officers attended (no supervisor) 
and were informed by the occupant, who had left the house in fear, of the man’s 
deteriorating mental condition. Four officers entered the house, spoke to the man, and for 
approximately 25 minutes were in and out of the house discussing, with officers outside, 
what they should do. Eventually, the man walked out of the house (without being 
searched), and was followed about 20 yards behind by two officers on foot and two officers 
in a van. They explained they were allowing him to walk to a nearby A&E department (15 
minutes’ walk) to get a voluntary mental health assessment and were following to ensure he 
arrived. Five minutes later, on a busy main road, there was a standoff between the man and 
the officers, resulting in a struggle to arrest him. Two officers were assaulted. Back at the 
station, several officers and a sergeant gathered around a computer to look at body cam 
footage of the arrest (and police assault). The body cam had only been turned on prior to 
the arrest. I noted in my field notes, 
The crux of the whole incident appeared to be condensed into one violent struggle 
and arrest. There was no discussion over the actions at the house; the delay in 
making a decision and the (potentially dangerous) rationale for letting him walk to 
the hospital. It was obvious to me, that after forty hours and several incidents into 
my observations, I was witnessing a group of officers, mostly young in service, who 
lacked supervision, leadership and decision-making skills at ongoing incidents where 
there was a risk of immediate, serious harm to people in the vicinity. These incidents 
were routinised, nothing special, an everyday occurrence. They were one of several 
incidents on a computerised list, allocated and finished, unnoticed. No paper trail or 
scrutiny of actions or decisions. They were beyond the scope of bureaucratic 
process. Yet these were every day incidents where the most serious threat of risk 
and harm to the public lay. 
Officers dealing with individuals with mental health issues made different decisions based 
on the dichotomy of choosing a health or criminal course of action (detaining and taking to 
hospital or arresting on suspicion of committing a crime). Either course of action gave 
officers the opportunity to turn an open into a closed task, in other words to reduce the 
complexity and ambiguity (and responsibility) of action at the scene. At one incident 
witnessed, where a male in a house was threatening to kill himself with a knife, six officers 
(who were first at the scene) stood chatting in the front garden, leaving two paramedics 
(who attended five minutes later) and a neighbour inside for over 20 minutes, oblivious to 
what was or could occur. This incident was finalised to the police control operative as an 
‘ambulance job’ with no details taken by the officers. Explaining the motivation for this 
redistribution of responsibility, which in numerous cases led to vulnerable individuals 
spending over 24 hours in police cells, a custody sergeant said, 
There are a lot more people coming in with mental health issues, and because of austerity 
and driving things down, the cops do not have the time or skill sets to deal with risk on the 
street. So very often, they will bring risk into here (custody) and hope that one of us will 
manage that risk and sort out the problem for them. In many, many cases, we are the first 
point of supervision for lots of officers. 
Standardised practice, encouraged through the policing professionalisation programme, was 
not achievable in most tasks allocated to officers in the invisible policing environment of 
Eastside. Closed, prescriptive processes, limited to less ambiguous tasks, were scrutinised 
post-incident, at least up to a point. Yet in the majority of practice, officers deskilled in many 
facets of policing (notably crime scene management and crime investigation) did not display 
experiential skills and the characteristics of autonomy and discretion associated with 
occupational professions (Abbott, 1988; Lipsky, 2010). Empathetic communication skills, 
statement taking, use of multi-agency referrals and process compliance were all in evidence 
when the incident and outcomes of vulnerability incidents were specific and unambiguous. 
Yet, even in these cases, the consequences of a lack of proactivity and deskilling led to poor 
investigations and delayed opportunities to arrest perpetrators, both affecting outcomes for 
victims. Where the scrutiny process increased the visibility of practice, completing processes 
to a high standard appeared more important than achieving justice for victims. One 
instructive example of this took place when a junior officer was commended for dealing 
with a domestic violence incident by a mentor after taking a detailed statement and 
updating the relevant databases. I questioned why the force wasn’t attempting to 
immediately find and arrest the perpetrator who had recently been released from prison for 
the same offence. “We’ve done all we can, someone else will pick it up later” was the 
answer I was given. The officer had complied with all the elements of post-incident scrutiny 
including a simple, closed answer to the question—‘Arrest Yes/No?’ Scrutiny of any 
proactive attempts to subsequently find, detain and question the perpetrator was non-
existent. In the invisible environment of policing in Eastside, compliance with control 
metrics provided some opportunities to employ good practice, standardisation and 
accountability. But, in general, it left officers in a practice ‘black hole’, trying to do their best 
but without a sense of direction or purpose. As an officer said, ‘We’re doing the wrong 
things for the right reasons’. 
 
Controlling the Visible Environment 
Police custody is a heavily controlled environment, governed by law, custody, convention 
and technology—a liminal space between the community, prison and hospital (Moran, 
2013). Discourse of control in carceral environments usually describes bureaucratic staff 
power over powerless inmates (Goffman, 1961; Skinns, 2009) who languish, abandoned in 
punitive spaces (Moran, 2015). The carceral environment—the cells, CCTV, the raised 
‘booking-in’ desks and subterranean lighting—are all parts of a tight control mechanism 
creating a potentially highly coercive environment (Skinns et al., 2017). Sociological, 
organisational or criminological research rarely, if at all, focuses on the flip side of carceral 
control, that is, organisational surveillance of staff to enable directed outcomes and the 
powerlessness of staff trying to carry out their functions in a way which they believe best 
serves both the welfare of detainees and the effective progression of the criminal justice 
process. 
CCTV cameras in Eastside’s custody suites covered virtually every area of the staff working 
environment, including the van dock (where vans transporting detainees enter and leave 
the custody suite), entry and exit doors, cells, corridors, booking-in desks, forensic sample 
rooms and a portion of back office space (depending on design). Specific locations also had 
24-hour audio recording. The only areas not covered were a handful of private offices. 
Documentation of all staff and detainee actions and movement took place on an electronic 
custody database that timed every input. Specific data fields with drop-down entries 
(whether relevant to the scenario or not) could not be avoided, which minimised the use of 
free text comments. Actions and movements were frequently crossed-referenced from both 
sources (CCTV and custody record) to verify performance, complaints, adverse incidents 
(e.g. injury, assault, suicidal attempts or death in custody) and evidential facts. Visibility of 
staff practice (to the organisation) was therefore extremely high, creating a risk-averse 
approach by staff to daily routines, as described by a custody sergeant: 
Detainees can quite often dwell in cells between eight and sixteen hours for fairly simple 
offences. The cause is bureaucracy, risk assessments. The whole organisation is so risk 
averse it’s phenomenal. Everything is gone through with a fine-toothed comb, about risks 
when they come in and risks when they leave the station. Nobody comes to work expecting 
somebody to die in custody. If someone does it’s mayhem on yourself and staff for eighteen 
months. We are scrutinised by the Coroner, IPCC, Professional Standards, the Home Office 
and everything gets scrutinised to the Nth degree. As a result, we are trying to box off all 
those risks before they happen. It’s gone too far I think. 
Many officers described a ‘blame culture’ in policing fuelled by the availability and 
subsequent misinterpretation and misuse of data by superiors and oversight authorities. 
Another sergeant said, 
The point is, if you scrutinise any police activity, and we have it in custody, you will find fault. 
[The officer goes on to describe an incident where he believed his actions had saved the life 
of a suicidal detainee.] Did we ever get a thanks for saving his life? No. The criticism was, you 
missed a visit [staff have a legal requirement to regularly check detainees]. We don’t actually 
look at what’s going wrong to stop it happening again, we just look to find someone to hang 
out to dry. ‘We’ is the whole corporate organisation. 
The policing prioritisation of a vulnerability agenda has refocused custody practice 
requirements and changed staff perception of their role, as described by a custody sergeant: 
Our priority used to be assisting officers with the investigations, ensuring PACE was 
complied with in pursuance of a positive outcome at court, a successful prosecution. Now, 
our priority is not prosecution, but diverting them to other services and ensuring medical 
and mental health issues are addressed while they are here. The investigation bit gets a back 
seat. 
National criticism of poor police practice in custody regarding the identification and 
management of detainee health issues (see HMIC, 2015; and individual police force custody 
inspections by HMIC between 2011 and 2014) has led to the implementation of 
standardised, prescriptive processes, as an officer describes: 
You become used to it. You know the process, which route to go down. It’s a standardised 
process. If someone presents with what you think are serious mental health problems, the 
process is they initially see a nurse, who will refer it on to a duty [police-employed] doctor, 
then the on-duty [NHS] doctor. If they think they need a full mental health assessment they 
call on more specialists who decide if that person needs to be taken into care. . . . Personally, 
I think the seven out of ten ratio of detainees having mental health problems has changed. 
It’s worse now than three years ago. I think it’s us being more aware of what risk people 
pose. Having more intrusive risk assessments changes how we work. We don’t do police 
work in here anymore. We basically look after people. 
Unintended consequences of new process requirements and system changes to improve the 
management of vulnerability in custody impacted on staff and detainees. Staff constantly 
talked about the pressure of getting things right, not missing parts of the process, in 
particular for detainees with obvious or self-declared mental health conditions. The process 
includes over 50 health check questions on arrival, referrals to in-house medical staff, 
collection of medication, timed cell visits, referral to external agencies, exit risk 
assessments. One officer commented, 
In the past an officer would say, “he’s only here for an hour, Sarge, for a quick interview”. 
Now, if he says, “I’m suicidal” or has suicidal thoughts, then that person is staying in until 
they have had an exit risk assessment. They will not be released. You can’t reduce custody 
times now. The only way is not to bring them in in the first place. 
In many cases in Eastside, vulnerable detainees with mental health issues were kept in 
custody beyond legal time limits set by the Police and Crime Evidence Act, 1984, just to be 
seen by an in-house doctor for an exit risk assessment, primarily because the staff and the 
organisation put safety and risk aversion before the legal process. Incorporating the whole 
medical management process in custody, those detainees most likely to suffer from 
prolonged spells of incarceration (those at risk of self-harm, for example), spent the longest 
time in custody, sometimes well beyond 24 hours. In many cases officers on the streets who 
had chosen the criminal route of action which placed the risk onto the custody staff, or had 
performed a ‘mercy arrest’ to get a health intervention, were potentially putting vulnerable 
people at risk of greater harm. Officers questioned the impact interventions in custody 
actually had on the lives of detainees after their release. Staff generally felt it was a ‘back-
covering’ exercise that couldn’t be deviated from, which started, in many cases, with poor 
actions and choices by officers on the streets (in the invisible environment where actions 
weren’t scrutinised). As one custody sergeant put it, 
We have a tier of management normally who are disinterested. They have no consequential 
management. They think it’s a good idea. There’s indifference about leadership . . . We talk 
around things. Achieving the task is not important, it’s the method of how we do it. 
 
Conclusion 
Power (2007, p. 160), analysing the features of institutional environments in risk regulation, 
poses a critical question: “What are the collective institutional mechanisms by which some 
uncertainties and hazards become managerially and politically visible, and others do not?” 
This chapter, focusing on policing in England and Wales, has incorporated the crucial 
significance that environmental and task characteristics play in an organisation’s actual 
capability to control practice. The imposition of a top-down, managerialist-driven change 
programme on policing in England and Wales, to improve standards and re-prioritise 
practice with increased auditability and accountability, has improved visibility of practice 
and outcomes in limited, carefully chosen areas. HMIC annual reports document exhaustive 
inspection results on prioritised themes, vindicating the progress of the change programme. 
My exploration in this chapter of the everyday reality of practice at street level questions 
both the validity of disclosed outcomes of auditable tasks and the oversight of ignoring 
(intentionally or not) invisible practice. The disciplinary logic of control applied to policing, 
through managerialist mechanisms, fails the criteria of legitimacy and professional 
competence (Fournier, 1999). 
Authentic and legitimate internal and external accountability of street-level worker practice 
in low-visibility environments is rarely viable or achievable (Reiner, 2000). Police work 
requires individuals to exercise judgement and skill in the management of ambiguous and 
complex tasks (Bayley and Bittner, 1984). In the invisible environment, a lack of any scrutiny 
of the management of incidents where there was risk of serious harm to those involved, 
coupled with deskilling in core areas of police work, produced a toxic situation of inertia and 
organisational paralysis. Many of these incidents (it could be argued all) involved vulnerable 
people. Improving standards and practice, even within the prioritised agenda of 
vulnerability, was not achieved. This was backed up by observation of numerous other non-
mental-health incidents. Improved visibility of street practice was partly achievable by 
prescribed closed tasks or where officers chose to close an open task by passing 
responsibility to an internal or external source. Both these scenarios tended to lead to poor 
outcomes for victims. Risk aversion, lack of experiential knowledge and process reliance and 
compliance all contributed towards weak management of incident scenes, poor 
investigation of crime and the injustice of lengthy incarceration of those most vulnerable. In 
the highly visible world of police custody, surveillance of practice and fear of scrutiny, 
alongside the imposition of structurally closed tasks and processes, changed the mentality 
and practice of staff. Personal survival of detainees was discussed in the context of staff 
survival from rebuke and disciplinary action. Complying with health management overruled 
legal and human rights compliance. In both the invisible and visible environments, concerns 
about the effectiveness of control metrics led to further bureaucracy to control the 
application of controls (Power, 2007). Overwhelmed and hemmed in by mushrooming 
administrative processes, supervisory and managing staff in both environments felt 
hindered in their capacities to fulfil their professional roles, notably when it came to 
mentoring and developing junior officers. 
Policing is undergoing institutional and cultural change to address historical failures and new 
challenges. The operationalisation of change, however, has been practically limited in its 
ability to control practice in different environments and very problematic when it comes to 
the tension between autonomy and control. The challenge is how to enable knowledge 
management from above and utilise skills and experiential knowledge from below 
(Gundhus, 2012). Literature on the role of street-level bureaucrats as autonomous enablers 
of public policy implementation is particularly significant (Hupe and Hill, 2007; Lipsky, 2010; 
Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2003) in light of organisational challenges to bridge practice 
gaps in the physical environments of work. Core skills of occupational professionals cannot 
be dismantled without consequences. Experiential knowledge and discretional decision-
making, gained through mentorship, supervisory support and trust in self-regulation, could 
be embedded in training and practice direction on new priorities, aims and outcomes 
(Myhill and Johnson, 2016). Awareness of environmental and task characteristics by 
policymakers and collaboration between practitioners and managers on ‘what really works’ 
to improve and maintain quality of public service may provide a localised, community-based 
service that incorporates accountability at both local and institutional level. If the 
problematic scope and reach of managerialism in the public sector continues to operate in 
its current vacuum, with management semi-aware of what is happening in limited areas of 
practice but oblivious to the rest, the concerns of practitioners and academic observers 
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